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CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-ABSENT A 
SHOWING OF PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT, DUE PRO-
CESS IS NOT VIOLATED BY PROSECUTOR'S CONTACT WITH 
COUNSEL FOR DEFENSE WITNESS IN AN EFFORT TO PRE-
VENT PERJURY. United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 913 (1985). 
An individual was charged with two counts of possession of a fire-
arm by a convicted felon. J After the first day of trial, the prosecutor con-
tacted counsel for a defense witness and advised counsel that if the 
witness perjured himself, the witness's pretrial diversion agreement 
would be revoked. 2 Counsel for the defense witness discussed the prose-
cutor's warning with his client and suggested that the client avoid testify-
ing if possible. Prior to the commencement of the second day of trial, the 
defense witness sought out the prosecutor, who repeated the warning 
against perjury but refused to discuss the matter further. The defense 
objected to the prosecutor's warning on the theory that the warning had 
intimidated the witness and the trial court heard this evidence out of the 
presence of the jury. The trial court concluded that no prejudice to the 
defendant had occurred. The witness testified as planned, and the defen-
dant was convicted. 3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed, holding that, absent a showing of prejUdice to the de-
fendant, the prosecutor's contact with counsel for a defense witness in an 
effort to prevent perjury does not violate the defendant's due process 
rights.4 The court reasoned that the allegedly intimidated witness's testi-
mony pertained to the first count on which the defendant was acquitted; 
1. United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d 378, 379 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 
913 (1985). Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is a federal crime. 18 U.S.C. 
App. § 1202(a) (Supp. 1985) provides that "[a]ny person who-(l) has been con-
victed by a court ... of a felony ... and who receives [or] possesses ... any firearm 
... shall be fined ... or imprisoned ... or both." The defendant had been convicted 
previously of felonious breaking and entering in 1975 in a North Carolina state 
court. Teague, 737 F.2d at 379. 
2. Teague, 737 F.2d at 380. "Diversion ... is the disposition of a criminal complaint 
without a conviction, the noncriminal disposition being conditioned on either the 
performance of specified obligations by the defendant, or his participation in coun-
seling or treatment." R. NIMMER, DIVERSION 5 (1974); see also, U.S. Dep't of Jus-
tice, 1 U.S. Attorney's Manual § 12 (encourages use of pretrial diversion 
agreements). The witness had been the target of an investigation of alleged federal 
firearm sales violations. The investigation of the witness had been suspended upon 
entry into a diversion agreement with the Department of Justice. It was the cancel-
lation of this agreement that was used to threaten the defendant. Teague, 737 F.2d 
at 380. 
3. /d. 
4. Id. at 384. One of the issues in Teague involved an alleged possession of a firearm 
not mentioned in the indictment. The trial court admitted the evidence, having de-
termined that the evidence was more probative than prejudicial. Id. at 381. Another 
issue was the admission of testimony of a witness under cross examination by the 
prosecution relating to several illegal gun sales by the witness to the defendant. 
These sales were not the subject of the indictment. This testimony also was consid-
ered more probative than prejudicial, and it was held within the discretion of the 
court to admit the evidence. Id. 
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therefore, no prejudice had occurred.5 A dissenting judge, in an emphatic 
opinion, argued for reversal because the prosecutor's actions were a vio-
lation of due process and were harmful to the defendant because the ac-
tions interfered with the presentation of witnesses for the defense.6 
The leading case on intimidation of a defense witness is Webb v. 
Texas. 7 In Webb, the trial judge gave a lengthy warning against perjury 
to a defense witness, implying in his warning that the witness would lie, 
be prosecuted for perjury, be convicted, and have his sentence lengthened 
beyond that which he already was serving.8 The witness then refused to 
testify. The defendant was convicted, and the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals affirmed.9 The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the intimi-
dating warning caused the witness such extreme duress that he refused to 
testify.1O The Court stated that "the judge's threatening remarks, di-
rected only at the single witness for the defense, effectively drove that 
witness off the stand, and thus deprived the petitioner of due process of 
law under the Fourteenth Amendment."" 
5. Teague, 737 F.2d at 384. 
6. Id. (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); see infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
7. 409 U.S. 95 (1972). Webb relied in part on Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), 
where the Court reversed a state court conviction because a codefendant was not 
allowed to testify on behalf of the defendant. At the time, Texas statutes codified the 
common law bar to accomplices testifying for each other. The majority in Washing-
ton held that the sixth amendment right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses 
favorable to the defense had been violated through the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment: 
The right to offer testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, 
if necessary, is in plain terms, the right to present a defense, the right to 
present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to 
the jury so that it may decide where the truth lies. 
Washington, 388 U.S. at 19; accord In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (The trial 
judge, sitting as a one-man grand jury, sentenced the defendant for contempt with-
out a hearing. The Supreme Court reversed based on the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment, stating that "[a] person's right to ... be heard ... [is] basic 
in our system of jurisprudence; these rights include . . . a right . . . to offer 
testimony. "). 
8. 409 U.S. at 98. 
9. Webb v. State, 480 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Crim. App.), rev'd, 409 U.S. 95 (1972). 
10. Webb, 409 U.S. at 98. 
11. Id. The concept of due process is not susceptible to precise definition, but can be 
ascertained by a review of the process of judicial "inclusion and exclusion." David-
son v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877); see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,27 
(1949) ("To rely on a tidy formula for the easy determination of what is a funda-
mental right ... belittles the scale of the conception of due process. "). In general, 
due process is rooted in the notion of fair play. It protects the person from the 
arbitrary actions of government. See also Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 581 (1819) (argument ofD. Webster) ("The meaning 
[of due process] is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immu-
nities, under the protection of the general rules which govern society."). The roots 
of the concept of due process can be traced back through the common law to the 
Magna Carta, 1215 A.D. See generally 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENG-
LISH LAW 104 (3d ed. reprinted 1966) (noting the "vast influence" of the Magna 
Carta as the safeguard of personal liberty in the development of the concept of due 
process). 
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It is important to note that the state or federal prosecutor in crimi-
nal cases has a dual function. The prosecutor has a responsibility not 
only to pursue the case zealously, but also to "do justice." 12 It is permis-
sible for the prosecutor to warn a potentially adverse witness of the wit-
ness's fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination and 
of the witness's sixth amendment right to counsel. 13 In so doing, how-
ever, the prosecutor must exercise proper restraint. When it can be 
shown that a defense witness refused to testify after an alleged intimida-
tion by an overzealous prosecutor, the conviction must be reversed. 
For example, in United States v. Morrison 14 the defense witness was 
a codefendant against whom charges had been dropped. The prosecutor, 
on three occasions, warned the witness that if she testified, she would be 
reindicted. IS The prosecutor also used an invalid subpoena to bring the 
witness to his office where he repeated his warnings and advised the wit-
ness of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
Although she took the stand, the witness refused to testify fully, pleading 
the fifth amendment privilege. The defendant was convicted. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed because the wit-
ness's failure to testify fully for the defense violated the defendant's due 
process right. The court granted a new trial and gave instructions that if 
the intimidated witness was called for the defense and invoked her fifth 
amendment right not to testify, the defendant was entitled to an acquittal 
unless the government granted the witness immunity from use of her 
compelled testimony against her.16 
Morrison indicates that intimidation of a defense witness by an offi-
cial other than the trial judge can violate a defendant's due process 
12. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 7-13 (1979); see Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1935); State v. Pineau, 463 A.2d 779 (Me. 1983); Com-
monwealth v. Starks, 479 Pa. 51, 387 A.2d 829 (1978). 
13. STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE 
FUNCTION § 3.2(b) (Approved Draft 1971) ("In interviewing a prospective witness 
it is proper but not mandatory for the prosecutor or his investigator to caution the 
witness concerning possible self-incrimination and his possible need for counsel."). 
14. 535 F.2d 223 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Boscia v. United States, 429 U.S. 824 
(1976). 
15. Morrison, 535 F.2d at 225 (3rd Cir. 1976); accord Campbell v. State, 37 Md. App. 
89, 376 A.2d 866 (1977). In Campbell, the prosecution notified the court that it was 
reopening a stet processus to resume prosecution of the defense witness. On appeal, 
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the conviction because of preju-
dicial intimidation of the witness, based on the sixth and fourteenth amendments to 
the United States Constitution, stating the defendant could not receive a fair trial 
without benefit of use immunity for the witness. Campbell, 37 Md. App. at 100-01, 
376 A.2d at 872. 
16. Morrison, 535 F.2d at 229 (3rd Cir. 1976). See generally, Annot. 4 ALR 4th 617, 
621-24 (1981) (except in rare cases, use immunity for defense witnesses is at the sole 
discretion of the prosecution); 81 AM. JUR. 2D §§ 58-59 (1976) (witnesses) (noting 
that "use and derivative use" immunity, which prevents prosecuting authorities 
from making use of a witness's compelled testimony or its derivative fruits, is coex-
tensive with the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination). 
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rights. Decisions in other circuits also support this viewY In United 
States v. Thomas,18 the Sixth Circuit found the actions ofa Secret Service 
agent prejudicial to the defendant when, after the agent's threats, a de-
fense witness refused to testify.19 In Thomas, several codefendants were 
tried for counterfeiting. Defense counsel called one acquitted defendant 
as a witness to testify on behalf of the remaining defendants. In the hall-
way, a Secret Service agent informed the witness that if he were to testify, 
he would be indicted on another charge. Thereafter, the witness refused 
to testify. On appeal, the agent's actions were considered a deliberate 
attempt to intimidate the witness and were found to represent a substan-
tial interference with the defense. The case was reversed and remanded 
for a new trial. 20 
The Fifth Circuit read the holdings of Webb, Morrison, and Thomas 
to represent a "harmful per se" rule when it decided a case of witness 
intimidation in United States v. Hammond. 21 In Hammond, an FBI 
agent stopped a defense witness in the hall outside of the courtroom and 
warned him that if he continued to testify, he would have "nothing but 
trouble" in a related state case in which the witness was a codefendant. 22 
The witness refused to continue testifying, and the defendant was con-
victed. The Fifth Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction, finding that 
the intimidation of the defense witness was a violation of due process.23 
The court reasoned that the interference with the defense must have been 
deliberate and that a per se rule against this type of conduct was the best 
deterrent. 24 The court also stated there was no method to determine what 
testimony was rendered unavailable by the alleged intimidation. Because 
the testimony was made unavailable by a governmental agent, the gov-
ernment deprived the defendant of his right to present a thorough de-
fense. This deprivation was, therefore, "harmful per se."25 Although 
17. See, e.g., United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1979) (defense witness 
intimidated by an FBI agent); United States v. Thomas, 488 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 
1973) (defense witness intimidated by statement of Secret Service agent); United 
States v. Smith, 478 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (defense witness threatened with 
prosecution by Assistant United States Attorney). 
18. 488 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1973). 
19. Id. at 335. 
20. Id. at 336. 
21. 598 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1979). 
22. Id. at 1012. 
23. Id. at 1013. 
24.Id. 
25. Id.; see also United States v. Henricksen, 564 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) 
(As part of a plea bargain, witness agreed not to testify for or against defendant. On 
appeal, the government confessed error and the court reversed, holding that the 
government's actions were a violation of due process.). Compare People v. Cal-
lington, 123 Mich. App. 301, 333 N.W.2d 260 (1983) (court surveyed state intimi-
dation cases, determining that no per se rule was discernible; state courts use a case 
by case approach, reversing when prejudice to the defense is found) (case reversed 
based on sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution) with 
People v. Daly, 98 App. Div. 2d 803, 807-08,470 N.Y.S.2d 165, 170-71 (1983) 
(Lazer, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of a harmful per se rule when a defense 
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the failure of the defense witness to testify is an important factor in the 
due process analysis, it is not always determinative.26 In United States v. 
Valdes,27 the evidence showed that the only contact between the prosecu-
tor and the witness was in the presence of the defense counsel and that 
only one warning against perjury was given.28 After consulting with de-
fense counsel, the witness refused to testify, invoking the fifth amend-
ment privilege. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction, implicitly 
finding no intimidation and no prejudice on these facts. 29 
Prior to its decision in United States v. Teague,30 the Fourth Circuit 
in United States v. MacCIoskey31 had the opportunity to review the al-
leged intimidation of a defense witness. Although MacCioskey was de-
cided in part on other grounds, the court took special note of actions of 
the government that can lead to a defense witness's refusal to testify.32 
In MacCloskey, an indicted codefendant planned to give exculpatory 
testimony for the defendant. Prior to trial, the prosecutor advised defense 
counsel that charges against the codefendant witness would be dropped. 
After trial began, however, the prosecutor called the codefendant wit-
ness's attorney and advised that if the codefendant testified and incrimi-
nated herself, she would be reindicted.33 On the fourth day of trial, the 
codefendant's risk of self-incrimination and her alleged intimidation by 
the prosecutor were brought before the court.34 The court held a voir 
dire examination of the codefendant out of the jury's presence. Her testi-
mony exonerated both herself and the defendant; the charges against her 
then were dropped. 35 Nonetheless, when called to testify later in the trial, 
witness is intimidated through judicial or prosecutorial misconduct based on the 
sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution). 
26. One court of appeals's decision suggests that intimidation may not be reversible 
error where the favorable testimony would have been cumulative in relation to other 
testimony on the record. Thus, even if the trial court denied the defendant the 
favorable testimony, no prejudice would occur. United States v. Peltier, 585 F.2d 
314,330-32 (8th Cir. 1978); see also People v. Robinson, 144 Cal. App. 3d 962, 193 
Cal. Rptr. 92 (1983) (in response to multiple warnings against perjury, the witness 
refused to testify; the appellate court found that the testimony would have been 
cumulative, and therefore no reversible error had occurred). 
27. 545 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1977). 
28. Id. at 960. 
29. Id. at 959-60. The court also noted defense counsel's failure to place the issue of 
intimidation squarely before the trial court and failure to include an affidavit neces-
sary to perfect the appeal. Id. 
In contrast to the holding of Valdes is United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 
1008 (5th Cir. 1979), decided two years later. In Hammond, a more egregious case 
of intimidation, the Fifth Circuit developed a "harmful per se" rule regarding the 
prosecution's interference with the presentation of the defense. 598 F.2d at 1013; see 
supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text. 
30. United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 913 
(1985). 
31. 682 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1982). 
32. Id. at 479. 
33. Id. at 475. 
34.Id. 
35.Id. 
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the now former codefendant invoked her fifth amendment privilege when 
asked certain questions. 36 On appeal, the court expressed "serious 
doubts" regarding the propriety of the prosecutor's contacts with the for-
mer codefendant's counsel. The government conceded that the contact 
was "ill-advised and possibly improper."37 The court condemned the 
prosecutor's actions that had interfered with the presentation of the de-
fense and reversed the defendant's conviction.38 
In United States v. Teague,39 the Fourth Circuit held that absent a 
showing of prejudice to the defendant, such as refusal of a defense wit-
ness to testify fully, due process is not violated by a prosecutor's contact 
with counsel for a defense witness in an effort to prevent perjury.40 The 
court noted, however, that the prosecutor's actions were "dangerous and 
foolish," because the contact and warnings to the defense witness were a 
potential violation of due process and could have prejudiced the defend-
ant's case.41 
The court's holding was based on three factors. First, the witness 
testified as planned by the defense. The court noted that in intimidation 
cases where convictions were reversed, the defendant somehow has been 
denied the witness's testimony.42 In Teague, the court found that the de-
fense witness did not invoke the fifth amendment privilege43 and testified 
without alteration, despite the alleged threats of the prosecutor.44 
Second, the witness presented no exculpatory testimony as to count 
one of the indictment, the count on which the defendant was convicted.45 
The witness had not been present at the time of the arrest that was the 
basis of count one.46 The court stated that the alleged intimidated witness 
"could not help ... or hurt [the defendant] on the issue of knowingly 
having possession [of the firearm]. " "47 
36.Id. 
37. Id. at 479. 
38.Id. 
39. 737 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 913 (1985). 
40. Id. at 384. 
41. Id. at 382. In Teague, the dissent would hold that the prosecutor's actions were not 
harmless. /d. at 384-86 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the 
case against the defendant was not "overwhelming" and that the credibility of the 
witness allegedly intimidated was crucial to the defense. Thus, the dissent reasoned 
the accused's presentation of his defense may have been prejudiced especially in 
light of the witness's "nervous and scared" demeanor when testifying. The prosecu-
tor's aggressive stance against the witness should therefore rise to harmful error. Id. 
at 384-86. 
42. Id. at 384. 
43. 737 F.2d at 384; cf United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 475-76 (4th Cir. 
1982) (A defense witness refused to testify after threat of reindictment by the prose-
cutor. The court held the defendants' due process rights had been violated.). 
44. 737 F.2d at 384. 
45. Id. Count one involved Teague's arrest on January 31,1979 while in possession ofa 
firearm. Id. at 380. Teague was acquitted as to count two, a possession of firearms 
charge, alleged to have occurred on May 21, 1979. Id. at 380-81. 
46. /d. at 381, 384. 
47. Id. at 381. 
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Third, the alleged intimidating contact occurred between the prose-
cutor and the witness's counsel rather than between the prosecutor and 
the witness himself. The court rejected a per se rule prohibiting "any 
contact between the prosecutor and an attorney for a witness made in an 
effort to prevent perjury .... "48 
The dissent argued in favor of reversal in Teague 49 based on three 
facts: interference by the prosecutor with a defense witness; evidence on 
the record indicating a negative effect on the witness's demeanor; and the 
absence of an overwhelming case against the defendant. 50 For the dis-
sent, these facts combined to result in error which was not harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt. 51 
Teague is consistent with decisions that do not apply a "harmful per 
se" rule to allegations of defense witness intimidation. 52 The Teague 
court also followed previous decisions that criticize governmental con-
duct that allegedly intimidates a defense witness. 53 Although the ques-
tion of how to discipline the overreaching prosecutor has not fully been 
decided, the Supreme Court in United States v. Hasting 54 has offered sug-
gestions. In Hasting, three alternative disciplinary measures were set out: 
the trial court could order the prosecutor to show cause why he should 
48. Id. at 384. 
49. Id. (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). 
50. Id. at 385-86 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). 
51. Id. at 386-87 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). The dissent based its constitutional harm-
less error analysis on Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), and United States 
v. Hasting, 103 S. Ct. 1974 (1983), and found that the prosecutor's error was harm-
ful to the defense. Both Chapman and Hasting, however, involved a prosecutor's 
comments on the defendant's failure to testify, but also stand for the general propo-
sition that certain federal constitutional deprivations do not warrant reversal unless 
it can be shown that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
majority in Teague does not specifically address this issue. 
52. See, e.g., United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 479 (4th Cir. 1982) (court uses 
a constitutional analysis to find error and avoids a "harmful per se" rule); United 
States v. Simmons, 670 F.2d 365,368-72 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (court analyzed the rec-
ord at length, concluding that the record was insufficient to support a claim of in-
timidation), affd on reh'g after remand, 699 F.2d 1250 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 
S. Ct. 121 (1983); United States v. Valdes, 545 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1977) (under 
careful analysis, facts did not rise to prejudicial intimidation); United States v. Mor-
rison, 535 F.2d 223, 228 (3d Cir.) (court used a constitutional, harmless error analy-
sis to find a violation of due process but did not use the phrase "harmful per se"), 
cert. denied sub nom. Boscia v. United States, 429 U.S. 824 (1976); United States v. 
Thomas, 488 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1973) (analysis revealed that the misconduct of the 
government resulted in prejudicial inference when the intimidated witness failed to 
testify); cf United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1979) (intimidation 
of defense witness by FBI agent was per se harmful error warranting reversal). 
53. See United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 475 (4th Cir. 1982); United States 
v. Simmons, 670 F.2d 365, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd on reh'g after remand, 699 
F.2d 1250 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 121 (1983); United States v. Ham-
mond, 598 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 224 
(3rd Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Boscia v. United States, 429 U.S. 824 (1976); 
United States v. Smith, 478 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Thomas, 
488 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1973). 
54. 103 S.Ct. 1974 (1983). 
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not be disciplined by the court; the trial court could ask the Department 
of Justice or an equivalent state agency to initiate disciplinary proceed-
ings against the prosecutor; or the court could identify publicly and chas-
tise the prosecutor in its opinion. 55 
The Teague court chose to discipline the prosecutor by naming the 
prosecutor in the opinion and declaring the prosecutor's actions foolish 
and dangerous. 56 This is the least imposing of the three disciplinary 
measures set out in Hasting,57 and it is questionable how effective this 
method will be in discouraging prosecutorial overreaching. The first two 
options place a prosecutor's career in immediate jeopardy. Naming the 
prosecutor is embarrassing and may harm the prosecutor's career, but it 
attaches less immediate jeopardy to the prosecutor. Cases indicate that 
prosecutorial overreaching is recurrent in the courts,58 despite instances 
of public chastisement of the prosecutor in order to effect discipline. 59 
The Teague court did go further by condemning the prosecutor's actions 
as dangerous and foolish. 60 Hence, the Fourth Circuit cautioned prosecu-
tors not to overreach when warning a defense witness about the penalties 
for perjured testimony. 
In rejecting a per se rule prohibiting any contact between a prosecu-
tor and an attorney for a witness,61 the Teague court implies that if the 
contact were between a prosecutor and a witness without counsel the 
result might be different. This implication is tenuous, however, because 
the facts of the case demonstrate that there also were direct contacts be-
tween the prosecutor and the witness.62 The court acknowledged this 
55. Id. at 1979 n.5. Hasting involved a prosecutor's comment on the silence of the de-
fendant and the failure of the defendant to rebut certain testimony. The Court found 
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the "overwhelm-
ing" record of evidence against the defendant. Id. at 1982. 
56. United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d 378, 382 (4th Cir. 1984). 
57. 103 S. Ct. 1974, 1979 n.5 (1983). 
58. See United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 475 (4th Cir. 1982); United States 
v. Simmons, 670 F.2d 365, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Hammond, 598 
F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 224 (3d 
Cir. 1976); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1935); United States 
v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631,662 (1946) (Frank, J., dissenting) ("If this 
court really meant business about such behavior as that of government counsel ... , 
it would deprive him of the right to practice in this court and would recommend 
that he be removed from his office .... "). 
59. See United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468,475 (4th Cir. 1982); United States 
v. Simmons, 670 F.2d 365, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Hammond, 598 
F.2d 1008, IOlO (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 224 (3d 
Cir. 1976). 
60. United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d 378,382 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 
913 (1985). 
61. Id. at 384. 
62. There were at least two confrontations between the prosecutor and the witness. 
They met once in the hall before the trial resumed on the second day and again 
when the witness took the stand under cross examination. In addition, prior to 
Teague's trial the witness himself had been the target of an investigation. Teague, 
737 F.2d at 380, 386 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); cf J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN 
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problem through an analysis of other intimidation cases,63 but limited 
the scope of the holding to the narrow, factual question of whether the 
witness testified for the defense.64 A fortiori, the court was content to 
dispose of the issue of a due process violation based on the witness's testi-
fying. In any event, the testimony the witness gave was not exculpatory 
as to count one, the count on which the conviction was obtained.65 
Teague requires the prosecutor to walk a fine line when dealing with 
defense witnesses. When interviewing a prospective witness, it is proper 
for the prosecutor to warn a witness against self-incrimination.66 In addi-
tion, the prosecutor has a dual responsibility, not only to prosecute zeal-
ously, but "to do justice."67 Thus, the prosecutor is faced with a 
dilemma. The prosecutor may warn against perjury, but runs the risk of 
prejudicing the defendant's case if the prosecutor is overzealous and in-
timidates the witness. The more aggressive and outrageous the conduct 
of the prosecutor, the more scrutiny the conduct will receive.68 Hence, 
admonitions regarding perjury preferably are left to the court.69 
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 781 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (giving several illustrations 
where a witness is abused under examination, rendering his testimony suspect). 
63. Teague, 737 F.2d at 382-84. 
64. [d. at 382 n.!. 
65. [d. at 384. But see Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972) (although it was unlikely that 
the intimidated witness's testimony would have been exculpatory because the wit-
ness was an inmate at the time of the alleged crime and was not at the scene, the 
trial court's actions that prevented the witness from testifying for the defense were 
considered a violation of the defendant's fourteenth amendment right to due process 
of law). 
66. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
67. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
68. Compare Teague, 737 F.2d at 380 (prosecutor advised attorney for witness that his 
client's pretrial diversion agreement would be revoked if the witness committed per-
jury) and United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1982) (prosecutor 
advised attorney for witness that if the witness incriminated herself on the stand, she 
would be reindicted), with United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(Prosecutor's contact with the witness included several ex parte interviews, one of 
which was held under aegis of an invalid subpoena. In all contacts, the prosecutor 
advised of the dangers of testifying and that if the witness testified, her testimony 
would be used as evidence against her.), cert. denied sub nom. Boscia v. United 
States, 429 U.S. 824 (1976); see also State v. Huffman, 65 Or. App. 594, 672 P.2d 
1351 (1983) (prosecutor's conduct must be outrageous before court will order a re-
versal, citing as an example Campbell v. State, 37 Md. App. 89, 376 A.2d 866 (1977) 
(as trial began, prosecutor notified the court that he was reopening a case against the 
defense witness on related charges; conviction reversed because prosecutor's actions 
impermissibly infringed on defendant's rights under the sixth and fourteenth 
amendments to the United States Constitution». 
69. United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d at 387 (4th Cir. 1984) (Murnaghan, J., dissent-
ing); accord United States v. Simmons, 670 F.2d 365, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United 
States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 1976); see also State v. Koller, 87 
Wis. 2d 253, 274 N.W.2d 651 (1979) (where there had been no ex parte communica-
tion with the witness and the judge had given a single instruction on the witness's 
fifth amendment rights, there was no prejUdice to the defendant when the witness 
refused to testify); People v. Callington, 123 Mich. App. 301, 304, 333 N.W.2d 260, 
263 (1983) (if prosecutor feels that a warning against perjury is needed, he should so 
inform the court out of the presence of the witness, leaving the warning to the dis-
398 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 15 
Any change in the demeanor of a witness may evidence intimida-
tion.70 It is true that witnesses are often nervous and frightened under 
cross examination; vigorous confrontation is a necessary part of the ad-
versary system of jurisprudence. But when the witness's poor demeanor 
has been preceded by an openly aggressive extra-judicial stance by the 
prosecutor against that witness, and when the witness's testimony goes to 
the count on which the conviction is obtained, a change in the witness's 
demeanor should not be dismissed casually.71 Intimidation also can be 
shown by a change in the witness's testimony effected by the prosecutor's 
intimidating acts, 72or more commonly, by a refusal of the witness to tes-
tify after contact with the prosecutor.73 Defense counsel must be sensitive 
to the issue of intimidation and must respond quickly.74 In Teague, de-
fense counsel was successful in having the intimidated witness describe 
his postintimidation mental state at trial under oath. The witness told the 
trial judge that he knew "the bind [he was] in testifying up here."75 At 
oral argument, defense counsel described the witness's demeanor and de-
livery as "nervous and scared."76 These notations in the record provided 
grounds for the argument that the prosecutor's actions had violated the 
defendant's due process rights. 77 In contrast, many reported cases show 
the defense counsel's failure to preserve the intimidation issue for ap-
peaP8 by failing to have the witness take the stand and refuse to testify 
for the record.79 The misconduct of the prosecutor, and its degree of 
cretion of the court; conviction reversed because a perjury warning to the witness 
impermissibly infringed on defendant's rights under the sixth and fourteenth 
amendments to the United States Constitution.). 
70. United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d 378, 384-87 (4th Cir. 1984) (Murnaghan, J., dis-
senting); see supra text accompanying note 46. 
71. Teague, 737 F.2d at 387. 
72. Cf Clark v. State, 180 Ind. App. 472, 389 N.E.2d 712 (1979) (during recess, prose-
cutor spoke to defense witness to rectify inconsistent prior testimony; although wit-
ness subsequently changed his testimony, the court held there was no prejudice 
absent a showing of coercion on the record). 
73. Teague, 737 F.2d at 382 n.1. 
74. Defense counsel asked for a hearing on the day the alleged intimidation came to 
light. Teague, 737 F.2d at 380. The alleged intimidation had taken place that morn-
ing and the prior evening. Id. 
75. Id. at 385-86 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). 
76.Id. 
77. Compare Teague, 737 F.2d 378, 382-84 (witness implicitly held not to be intimi-
dated because he testified for the defendant) with United States v. Simmons, 670 
F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (defendant must show "substantial preju-
dice" on the record to obtain a reversal of conviction on grounds that the prosecutor 
deprived him of defense testimony by threatening a witness), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 
121 (1983) and United States v. Valdes, 545 F.2d 957, 959 (5th Cir. 1977) (appeal 
grounded almost entirely on an affidavit that was not part of the formal record). 
78. Teague, 737 F.2d at 384-88 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) arguing that the facts on the 
record regarding intimidation, when considered on balance with the "less than over-
whelming" case against the defendant, should be considered a prejudicial violation 
of due process of law). 
79. See, e.g., People v. McKiness, 105 Ill. App. 3d 92, 433 N.E.2d 1146 (1982) (counsel 
did not call the allegedly intimidated witness to the stand, thereby failing to place 
the issue on the record). 
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impropriety shown clearly on the record, will be dispositive of whether 
the defendant's due process rights to a fair trial have been violated. 80 
Dennis Patrick McGlone 
80. Teague, 737 F.2d at 384; see United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872 
(1982); see also State v. Ivy, 300 N.W.2d 310, 314 (Iowa 1981) ("It is not miscon-
duct that gives the defendant a right to relief, it is the prejudice which results there-
from."). But see United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d 378, 384 (4th Cir. 1984) 
(Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the record showed intimidation and inter-
ference warranting reversal); United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 
631,661 (1946) (Frank, J., dissenting) (urging that the prosecutor's outrageous con-
duct was cause for removal of prosecutor from office and for reversal of defendant's 
conviction); People v. Daly, 98 App. Div. 2d 803, 807-08, 470 N.Y.S.2d 165, 170 
(1983) (Lazer, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of a per se harmful error rule based 
on the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution whenever 
a defense witness is intimidated through judicial or prosecutorial misconduct). 
